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Abstract
This paper compares Kaleckian and Harrodian models of accumulation. The sim-
plicity of the canonical Kaleckian model is appealing but more complex Harrodian
specications are preferable from a behavioral perspective. The local instability of
Harrodian-inspired specications, moreover, o¤ers a unied understanding of both
trend and cycles.
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1 Introduction
Post-Keynesian theory is sometimes seen as encompassing almost anything non-mainstream.
Following the seminal contributions by Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984) and Taylor (1985),
however, Kaleckian models with stable steady-growth paths have come to dominate post-
Keynesian and structuralist macroeconomics. These models are characterized by a low
sensitivity of accumulation to variations in utilization, and with a given markup, the util-
ization rate becomes an accommodating variable in both the short and the long run. Thus,
the steady-growth value of the utilization rate is not, as in Harrodian or Robinsonian mod-
els, tied to a structurally determined desired rate. Instead, shocks to demand (changes in
saving rates, for instance) can have large, permanent e¤ects on utilization.
A substantial literature discusses the long-run relation between actual and desired util-
ization rates. Kurz (1986), Committeri (1986), Dumenil and Levy (1993), and Auerbach
and Skott (1988) are among those who have faulted Kaleckian models for their failure
to ensure that actual utilization and desired utilization coincide in steady growth.1 A
Kaleckian response has been articulated by Lavoie (1995, 1996), Amadeo (1986), Dutt
(1997), and Lavoie et al. (2004). I nd the Kaleckian response unconvincing (see Skott
2008 for details), and in this paper I shall argue that an alternative Harrodian approach is
both promising and analytically tractable. The paper goes over some of the same ground
as Lavoies interesting and inuential 1995-article, but the conclusions are rather di¤erent.
Harrodian models are more complex than the standard Kaleckian formulation. They
require a distinction between short-run and long-run accumulation functions and may gen-
erate unstable warranted growth paths. Despite these complexities, the analysis remains
tractable and the complexities bring signicant rewards. The Harrodian assumptions,
rst, can be given clear behavioral justications. The Kaleckian stability condition, by
contrast, is usually introduced for instrumental reasons to ensure stability, stability being
seen (implicitly but mistakenly) as imperative for the real-world relevance of the model.
Harrodian investment functions, second, can be compatible with multiple steady-growth
solutions, some of which may be stable, and the existence of multiple solutions carries
interesting implications. The (local) instability of a warranted growth path, third, quite
naturally leads to an integration of growth and cycles. As emphasized by Frisch, Slutsky
and Kalecki in the 1930s and 1940s as well as by most contemporary theories of the busi-
ness cycle, stochastic shocks may play a role in the generation of cyclical movements. But
the presence of shocks does not exclude endogenous mechanisms, and Harrodian instability
provides a powerful foundation for endogenous cycles.2
Section 2 outlines a basic Kaleckian model. A Harrodian perspective is presented
in section 3. Drawing on Skott (1989, 1989a) and Nakatani and Skott (2007), section
4 analyses a Kaldor/Marshall version of the Harrodian model. Two di¤erent cases are
1The desired rate of utilization is sometimes referred to as the normalrate or the targetrate.
2Other mechanisms may play a role as well. An example is endogenous, Minsky-type changes in nancial
behavior.
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considered: a dual-economycase in which the labor supply is perfectly elastic and the
growth of the economy can be determined without any reference to the labor market, and
a matureeconomy in which the labor supply limits the long-run rate of growth. The
relaxation of the standard Kaleckian assumption of a xed markup is a key element in
the analysis of both dual-economy and mature cases. In the Kaldor/Marshall version, the
xed markup is replaced by fast, demand-determined adjustments in the prot share and
sluggish movements of output. An alternative Robinson/Steindl version assumes sluggish
adjustments in prices and the prot share but fast output adjustments. This version
is considered in Section 5 which draws on Skott (2005) and Flaschel and Skott (2006).
Section 6 contains a few concluding comments.
2 A Kaleckian benchmark model
Kaleckian models have been extended and modied in many ways. Some extensions have
introduced a government sector and an explicit analysis of policy issues (e.g. Lima and
Settereld (2008)); others add nancial variables or open-economy complications (e.g.
Blecker 1989, 1999; Lavoie and Godley 2001-02, Dos Santos and Zezza (2008), Hein and
van Treeck 2007). For present purposes, however, a stripped-down model of a closed
economy without public sector and without nancial constraints on investment will su¢ ce.
Algebraically, the canonical Kaleckian model is exceedingly simple:
I
K
= + u+ r (1)
S
K
= s()u (2)
I
K
=
S
K
(3)
r = u (4)
 =  (5)
g = K^ =
I
K
   (6)
Using standard notation, equations (1)-(2) are the investment and saving functions. In-
vestment is increasing in utilization (u) and the prot rate (r), and the saving rate out
of income (s()) is an increasing function of the prot share ();  denotes the technical
output-capital ratio. Equation (3) is the equilibrium condition for the product market;
equation (4) denes the prot rate as the product of the prot share, the utilization rate
and the technical output-capital ratio. Equation (5) is the pricing equation with the prot
share xed by a markup on marginal cost, the latter assumed constant and equal to unit
labor cost. Equation (6) sets the growth rate of the capital stock (g = K^) equal to gross
accumulation minus the rate of depreciation, . All parameters are assumed positive and
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the Keynesian stability condition is supposed to hold,
@(I=K)
@u
=  +  < s() =
@(S=K)
@u
(7)
Simple manipulations of equations (1)-(6) imply that
u =

s()       (8)
g =
s()
s()          (9)
It is readily seen that if the saving function is linear (s() = s), the stability condition
(7) implies that
@u
@
< 0 (10)
@g
@
< 0 (11)
Thus, the economy is both stagnationist(equation (10)) and wage led(equation (11))
in the terminology of Marglin and Bhaduri (1990).3
Marglin and Bhaduri challenged these implications of the model and suggested that
the investment function be recast with accumulation as a function of utilization and the
prot share, rather than utilization and the prot rate,
I
K
= + u+  (12)
Using this alternative specication of the investment function, they showed that the Keyne-
sian stability condition need not produce stagnationist and wage-led regimes. The utiliz-
ation rate remains an accommodating variable, however, and the main di¤erence between
the investment functions (1) and (12) is that the sensitivity of investment to changes in
utilization has been reduced, relative to the sensitivity with respect to the prot share.
The non-stagnationist outcomes become possible precisely because, using (12) instead of
(1), we may have @(I=K)@ >
@(S=K)
@ , even when the Keynesian stability condition is satis-
ed, something that cannot occur when the investment function is given by (1) and the
saving function is linear (s() = s). Equivalently, equation (12) does not exclude the
possibility that, holding constant the rate of prot, an increase in utilization may reduce
accumulation. This is in sharp contrast to Harrodian formulations. Thus, although both
the Marglin-Bhaduri formulation and the Harrodian models below may produce prot-led
3The canonical model need not be stagnationist if the saving function is nonlinear (or just a¢ ne,
s () = s0 + s with s0 > 0) since in this case the Robinsonian stability condition ( @I@ <
@S
@
) can be
violated even if the Keynesian stabilitycondition ( @I
@u
< @S
@u
) is met. This point, which may have been
noted in the literature, was made by Ben Zipperer in comments on an early draft of this paper.
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outcomes, the behavioral assumptions are very di¤erent, and from a Harrodian perspective
the Marglin-Bhaduri specication su¤ers from the same problems as the original Kaleckian
model.
To simplify the exposition I shall set  equal to zero. In this special case, the two in-
vestment functions (1) and (12) coincide, the Keynesian stability condition can be written
s() > , and the equilibrium solutions for u and g take the form
u =

s()    (13)
g =
s()
s()       (14)
The model is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Unlike most illustrations, which
focus on the qualitative properties, gure 1 is based on Kaleckian benchmark values.
Empirically, the gross saving rate s() typically falls in the range 0.15-0.3 and the technical
output-capital ratio in the range 1-3. Figure 1 uses s() = 0:12; b = 0:08 and a = 0:03;
yielding an equilibrium utilization rate of u = a=(s()   b) = 0:75.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 and the numerical example illustrate one of the main weaknesses of the
Kaleckian analysis. Assume that the saving rate drops slightly, with s() falling from
0:12 to 0:11. As a result, the growth rate increases by 2 percentage points while the utiliz-
ation rate jumps from 75% to 100%. This strong sensitivity of utilization to variations in
parameters is an intrinsic property of the Kaleckian model. For any reasonable specic-
ation of the saving function, the Kaleckian stability condition puts a very low ceiling on
the maximum value of b (about 0.1). Shocks to the saving function therefore give rise to
uctuations in utilization rates that are at least about ten times larger than those in accu-
mulation. Shocks to the accumulation function (changes in a) produce movements along
the saving function and (given the stability condition) the ratio of variations in utilization
to variations in the growth rate is slightly larger, but still unlikely to be much below ten.
These implications do not t the data. Utilization rates are di¢ cult to measure, but ex-
isting data suggest modest long-run variations. As shown in gure 2a, utilization rates for
US manufacturing industry uctuate signicantly in the short run (as one would expect)
but the long-run trend is quite at, and the ratio of long-run variations in utilization to
long-run variations in growth is nowhere near the values suggested by the Kaleckian model
(gure 2b gives growth rates of capital capacity in US manufacturing).
Figures 2a-2b about here
From a theoretical perspective the problems with the Kaleckian specications arise
from the combination of an exogenous markup with the extension to the long run of a
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standard, Keynesian short-run stability condition: the relative insensitivity of investment
to variations in aggregate demand.4 A Harrodian approach addresses these issues.
3 A Harrodian alternative
A Harrodian specication of the investment function makes a distinction between the
short-run and the long-run sensitivity of investment to changes in aggregate demand. The
insensitivity of investment is plausible in the short run, but changes in aggregate demand
have lagged e¤ects on investment, and a weak impact e¤ect (which is required for the
stability of the short-run Keynesian equilibrium) does not guarantee that the long-term
e¤ects of a sustained increase in aggregate demand and utilization will be weak as well.
In a discrete-time framework (and still assuming, for simplicity, that only utilization
matters for investment), the presence of lags can be captured by a general specication,
(
I
K
)t = f(ut; ut 1; :::; ut m; (
I
K
)t 1; (
I
K
)t 2; :::; (
I
K
)t n) (15)
The short-run e¤ect of utilization on accumulation is given by the partial derivative
@f=@ut; and the Keynesian stability condition can be written
s() >
@f
@ut
(16)
The long-run e¤ect of changes in utilization, on the other hand, is given by
K^ =
I
K
   = (u) (17)
with
0(u) =
d IK
du jut=ut j ; IK t= IK t k
=
mP
i=0
@fut i
@ut i
1 
nP
j=1
@f I
K t j
@ I
K t j
(18)
The short-run condition (16) carries no implications for the relation between the long-run
sensitivity, 0; and s():
The signicance of the distinction between short-run and long-run specications de-
pends on the magnitude of the lagged e¤ects. According to Harrod the lagged e¤ects are
large and 0(u) >> s(). This condition is satised by the following special case of (15):
(
I
K
)t = (ut   ud) + ( I
K
)t 1 (19)
4Skott (2008) discusses the theoretical and empirical case against the Kaleckian investment function in
greater detail.
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or, in continuous time,
_g =
d
dt
K^ = (u  ud) (20)
where ud is the desired rate of utilization. The standard Harrodian specication in equa-
tion (20) implies that the accumulation rate becomes a state variable and that there is no
immediate impact of changes in utilization on investment. In the long run, by contrast,
accumulation is perfectly elastic: utilization must be at the desired rate in steady growth,
but as long as this condition is satised, the accumulation function imposes no constraints
on the growth rate. Thus, the specication (20) implies a particularly simple (even if
unconventional) steady-growth accumulation function:
u = ud (21)
Equation (21) is a special case of (17) with 0 =1 at u = ud.
The behavioral story behind the Harrodian specication is quite straightforward. Firms
have a well-dened objective (to maximize prots) and this objective implies a desired
utilization rate. Since capital stocks adjust slowly and demand expectations are not al-
ways met, actual utilization may deviate from desired rates in the short run. It would
be unreasonable, however, to assume that demand expectations can be persistently and
systematically falsied in steady growth. Consequently, it is hard to conceive of a steady-
growth scenario in which rms are content to accumulate at a constant rate despite having
signicantly more (or less) excess capacity than they desire. From a behavioral perspective
the only real question concerns the determination of the desired rate of utilization.5
The desired utilization rate may deviate from unity. A rm may want to hold excess
capacity to deter entry or to enable the rm to respond quickly to variations in demand; or
excess capacity may exist simply as a result of indivisibilities of investment (non-convexities
in adjustment costs). The desired degree of excess capacity, second, need not be constant
over time; changes in the degree of product market competition or in the volatility of
demand, for instance, could a¤ect desired utilization rates. Managerial constraints or
other bottlenecks, third, may make it di¢ cult or costly to expand capacity at a rapid
pace, and the desired utilization rate, consequently, may depend, inter alia, on the rate
of accumulation. This case can be represented by equation (17) which species a long-
run relation between accumulation and desired utilization. If the long-run accumulation
function is given by (17) with 0 < 0 <1, the counterpart to (20) is
_g = (u   1(g)) (22)
Using (22) instead of the Kaleckian investment function (1), the steady growth solu-
tions for u and g are determined by
g = (u) = s()u    (23)
5Chick and Caserta (1997) suggest that although the utilization rate must be at (or near) the desired
rate in long-run steady growth, deviations could last for signicant periods of time. Long-lasting deviations,
however, do not justify a depiction of this medium-run scenario as a self-sustaining equilibrium without
internal forces for change.
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and the economy is prot led in the long run: by assumption 0 > s() and hence
du
d
=
s0()u
0(u)  s () > 0 (24)
A Harrodian steady-growth path, however, may be unstable. This, indeed, is the case
with the simple model based on (2)-(3) and (22). The accumulation rate is predetermined
at any moment and the short-run Keynesian equilibrium is stable, but the trajectory of
Keynesian equilibria does not converge to the steady-growth path. Combining (2)-(3) and
(22), we get a one-dimensional di¤erential equation with an unstable stationary solution:6
_g = [
g + 
s()
   1(g)] (25)
and (since0 > s())
d _g
dg
= [
1
s()
  1
0(g)
] > 0 (26)
The instability of a Harrodian warranted growth path has been viewed as a powerful
argument against this approach. The argument may not be spelled out in any detail but
it is suggested, implicitly, that stability is needed for the model to make sense and/or for
the properties of the steady-growth path to be empirically relevant (e.g. Lavoie 1995, p.
794). There are several possible answers to these implicit claims. As argued in sections 4.1
and 5.1, stability may be achieved without abandoning a Harrodian investment function
if the xed markup is abandoned. More importantly, perhaps, the steady growth path
may be relevant even in the absence of asymptotic stability. Local instability is consistent
with endogenously generated, bounded uctuations around a steady-growth solution, and
an unstable steady-growth path may provide a good approximation to average outcomes
in the medium to long run.7 Sections 4.2 and 5.2 consider how boundedness may be
generated by a Marxian employment e¤ect, but the general argument clearly does not
depend on this particular mechanism.
4 Harrodian instability: a Kaldor/Marshall analysis
Kaldorian models from the 1950s and early 1960s include endogenous adjustments in the
prot share. Since the prot share is determined by the pricing equation, this calls for a
reconsideration of rmsprice and output decisions.
6The instability of the warranted growth pathwas emphasized by Harrod himself although he rejected
the knife-edge metaphor (Harrod 1973, p. 33).
7Using the simple Harrodian specication in (20), it is readily seen that if the uctuations in K^ are
bounded, the time-average of the utilization rate ratio u must be approximately equal to ud when the
average is taken over a long period. To show this, integrate (20) to get u  ud = K^t1 K^t0
(t1 t0) where u is the
average utilization rate over the interval [t0; t1]. If j K^t1   K^t0 j is bounded below some constant for all
(t0; t1), it follows that u converges to u for t1   t0 going to innity.
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In the Keynesian literature - both old and new - it is often assumed that rms set prices
and that output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to match demand. The empirical
evidence in favour of signicant price rigidity is quite weak, however,8 and output does
not adjust instantaneously. Production is subject to a production lag, and increases in
production and employment typically give rise to substantial search, hiring and training
costs; ring or layo¤s also involve costs, both explicit costs like redundancy payments
and hidden costs in the form of deteriorating industrial relations and morale. Based on
these considerations, a Kaldor/Marshall approach assumes fast price adjustments and
sluggish output movements: shocks to aggregate demand are accommodated initially by
movements in prices and prot shares, rather than in output and utilization.
In a continuous-time setting the e¤ects of lags and adjustment costs for output can be
approximated by assuming that output is predetermined at each moment and that rms
choose the rate of growth of output, rather than the level of output. If rms maximize
prots (or pursue some other well-dened objectives), the growth of output is chosen so
as to balance the costs of changes against the benets of moving toward a preferred level
of output and employment; (expected) costs and benets, in turn, are determined by the
demand and cost signals that rms receive from product and labor markets.
4.1 A dual economy
Consider rst a dual economy in which there is a perfectly elastic supply of labor to the
capitalist sector. Endogenous changes in the cost signal from input markets may be ignored
in this kind of economy. A perfectly elastic labor supply, to be sure, does not rule out
shifts in the perceived costs of changes in output. Exogenous shifts in worker militancy,
for instance, may a¤ect these perceived costs, but the dual-economy assumption implies
that labor market conditions do not change endogenously as a result of rmsoutput and
investment decisions.
The demand signal from product markets, by contrast, is endogenously determined.
If prices are fully exible, this signal can be captured by the prevailing prot share. By
assumption the level of output is predetermined, and a rise in demand leads to an increase
in the price of output. Wage contracts are cast in terms of money wages, and there
is neither perfect foresight nor instantaneous feedbacks from output prices to money-
wage rates. The real wage rate and the share of prots in income therefore respond to
unanticipated movements in prices: a positive demand shock generates a rise in the prot
8The study by Levy et al. (1997) of menu costs in ve supermarkets, for instance, is often cited in
support of menu costs and price stickiness (e.g. Romer 2001, pp. 315-316). This study found that on
average 16 percent of all prices were changed each week. These frequent changes in prices were not costless
but the nding that menu costs constitute a signicant proportion of net prots is largely irrelevant for an
evaluation of price exibility. With prohibitively high menu costs, for instance, there would be no price
changes and the share of menu cost in revenue would be zero; negligible menu costs on the other hand
may allow rms to change prices frequently as part of their marketing strategies, and the observed share
of menu costs in net prots could be very high in this case.
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share, and rms respond to this rise by increasing the growth rate of output.9
Algebraically, we get a generic growth function10
Y^ = h();h > 0 (27)
The growth function (27) replaces the pricing equation (5) and may, as the pricing equa-
tion, be inuenced by the sectoral composition of the economy and the degree of compet-
ition in the product markets. In general, the function is likely to be highly non-linear. It
seems reasonable to suppose that the adjustment costs for output are convex as a function
of Y^ , and there may also be upper and lower limits on the rate of growth, gmin  Y^  gmax:
Thus, the growth rate will be more sensitive to variations in the prot share for interme-
diate values of the prot share than for very high or very low values.
In a Kaldor/Marshall model it must be possible to accommodate aggregate demand
shocks through variations in prices and the prot share. This condition is satised here
since a rise in the prot share raises aggregate saving and reduces excess demand, as in
Keynes (1930) and Kaldor (1956). Using a linear version of equation (2),
S
K
= su (28)
the equilibrium condition for the product market yields the following solution for the prot
share
 =
g + 
su
(29)
where both g = K^ and u are predetermined, given a Harrodian investment function and
sluggish output adjustment.
In order to close the model, equations (28)-(29) need to be combined with a specic-
ation of the accumulation function. Consider rst the standard specication in equation
(20). Using the saving function (28), the steady-growth condition u = ud (implied by
(20)), and the equilibrium condition for the product market, the set of steady-growth
solutions for (; g) is characterized by
h() = sud    (30)
g = h() (31)
The non-linearity of the h-function implies that there may be multiple steady-growth
solutions, as in Figure 3b. Outcomes with a unique solution are also possible (Figures 3a
and 3c), and a case without steady-growth solutions can be obtained when the lower limit
9Demand signals could also be reected in inventories. For the aggregate economy, however, changes
in inventories tend to amplify uctuations in other demand components over the cycle. Thus, the need for
price adjustments would remain, even if inventories were included.
10The behavioral foundations of the function are discussed in greater detail by Skott (1989, chapter 4),
who used the term output expansion function.
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on Y^ is abandoned (gmin =  1); this case is illustrated in Figure 3d. Essentially, the
cases in 3a and 3d are identical since with negative growth rates, there can be capitalist
development in neither case.
Figures 3a-3d about here
Figure 3b represents the most interesting case. At the two extreme equilibria we have
h0 < sud; at the intermediate equilibrium this inequality is reversed. Not surprisingly,
the inequality is closely related to stability conditions. The prot share at any moment
is given by equation (29), and substituting (29) into the growth function (27), we get an
equation of motion for the utilization rate
u^ = Y^   K^ = h(g + 
su
)  g (32)
Equations (20) and (32) dene a two-dimensional system of di¤erential equations. Evalu-
ated at a stationary point, the Jacobian of the system is given by
J(g; u) =

0 
u( h
0
su   1)   uh0 g+su2

(33)
and
tr(J) =  uh0 g + 
su
< 0
det(J) =  u( h
0
su
  1) > 0 i¤ h0 < s
It follows that a steady-growth path is locally asymptotically stable if and only if h0() <
sud: The stability condition is satised at the two extreme solutions in gure 3b; the
intermediate solution on the other hand will be unstable.
Similar results can be obtained if investment is described by the static equation (17).
At rst sight, this may seem a peculiar accumulation function in a Harrodian analysis
but since utilization is treated as a state variable, the seemingly static specication (17)
embodies the main Harrodian principle.11 By assumption the impact e¤ect of changes
in aggregate demand falls entirely on prices and the prot share, and the insensitivity
of investment to short-run uctuations in demand is satised by (17); a strong long-run
sensitivity follows if 0(u) is large. Using (17) and (27)-(28), the steady-growth conditions
are given by
g = h() = su    = (u) (34)
11The distinction between short- and long-run e¤ects is observed as long as accumulation depends on a
state variable. In the Robinsonian model below, utilization adjusts instantaneously but the prot share
becomes a state variable.
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These equations can be described using a modied gure 3; the only di¤erence is that the
IS-curve (the solutions to the last equation in (34) for given ) will now be non-linear
in a (; g)-space; see gure 4 which corresponds to 3b.12 This specication of the model
produces a one-dimensional dynamic system
u^ = h(
(u) + 
su
)  (u) (35)
and local stability, again, is achieved at the two extreme solutions.13
Figure 4 about here
The above analysis of a dual economy has several noteworthy implications. The ex-
istence of multiple steady-growth paths, rst, implies that countries that initially seem
quite similar may follow very di¤erent growth trajectories and that temporary aggregate
demand policy may raise the long-run rate of growth. Suppose, for instance, that initially
an economy is at the low growth path in gure 3b (an analogous argument applies to
the specications underlying gure 4): Using a trivial extension of the model to include a
government sector, expansionary policy can reduce the average saving rate. The result is
a rise in the prot share for any given growth rate or, equivalently, a downward shift in
the IS-curve (the g = sud    line in gure 3b). If the shift is large enough, the new
conguration will be as in gure 3c, and a move to the high steady-growth equilibrium
may get under way. Once at the high-growth path, the expansionary policy is no longer
needed. Following a return to the old saving rate, the economy may now grow at the rate
associated with the high solution.
Shifts in the h- or s-functions or in the desired utilization rate ud (more generally,
in the accumulation function ), second, have permanent growth e¤ects. An increase in
animal spirits, for instance, may be reected in an upward shift in the h-function (an
increase in the growth of output for any given prot share) and/or a fall in the desired
utilization rate (corresponding to an upward shift in the investment function). At a stable
12Assuming a linear accumulation function,
g = (u) = (u  u0)
the equilibrium condition I = S implies
g = s
u0   
  s   
13Local stability requires
h0 [
0   s
su
]  0 < 0
or, equivalently,
h0 <
dg
d
where g is the growth rate that clears the product market for a given prot share, .
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growth path, not surprisingly, these shifts are unambiguously expansionary. A downward
shift in the s-function also raises the steady-growth solutions for both  and Y^ if the initial
position is at a stable steady-growth path. Since the prot share is endogenous, there is
no direct counterpart to the stagnationist Kaleckian paradox of costbut an increase in
the concentration rate and decline in competition will be associated with a downward shift
in the growth function and, starting from a stable growth path, a decline in the growth
rate.
The high steady-growth solution may have empirical counterparts in the experience of
successful developing countries, including Japan, Korea and China during their years of
miracle growth (it should be noted in this context that the average growth rate for a suc-
cessful developing economy with a large reserve of hidden unemployment understates the
growth of the modern, capitalist sector). Empirical counterparts to the low-growth trap
are not hard to nd either, and the Japanese stagnation since about 1990 and its relation
to the present framework are discussed in Nakatani and Skott (2007). But established
industrialized countries without signicant reserves of hidden unemployment and with re-
latively stable growth rates in the 1-5% range t neither the low nor the high equilibrium.
The intermediate solution might seem more promising, but the dual-economy assumption
is questionable for these economies and the model needs to be modied.
4.2 The reserve army of labor
Many writers (including Steindl (1952), Kaldor (1966, 1978) and Marglin (1984)) have
regarded capitalist accumulation as essentially unconstrained by the growth of the labor
force, a position that is reected also in the canonical Kaleckian model. This dual-economy
assumption is reasonable for many LDCs and NICs where the existence of hidden un-
employment makes the rate of open unemployment largely irrelevant as an indicator of
conditions in the labor market. In most OECD countries, however, measured employment
provides important information about the state of the labor market, and the growth func-
tion in section 4.1 needs to be extended: the cost of output variations can no longer be
taken as independent of the employment rate.14
The employment rate inuences the costs of changing output through its e¤ects on
the availability of labor with the desired qualications. Labor markets are not perfectly
competitive and it is harder for a rm to attract and retain workers when unemployment is
low. Thus, high employment rates increase the costs of recruitment and since the quit rate
tends to rise when labor markets are tight, the gross recruitment needs associated with
14A dual-economy scenario ts the OECD countries at an earlier stage of their development. Kaldors
rejection in the mid 1960s of his own labor-constrained models should be seen in the context of agricultural
employment shares that were still above 25 percent in countries like Japan and Italy and at or above 20
percent in France; West Germany had a smaller share (just over 10 percent) but had been experiencing
massive immigration in the 1950s (Kuznets (1971).
Arguably, the assumption still applies to the world economy as a whole, but a one-sector model of the
world economy without spatial disaggregation has obvious limitations.
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any given rate of expansion increase at a time when low unemployment makes it di¢ cult
to attract new workers. A high turnover of the labor force, on the other hand, allows rms
to reduce production and employment more rapidly without large adjustment costs when
the employment rate is high. These standard microeconomic e¤ects may be reinforced by
broader Marxian e¤ects on the social relations of production. A high rate of employment
strengthens workers vis-a-vis management. This shift in the balance of power may lead
to increased worker militancy, and increased monitoring and additional managerial input
may also be needed in order to maintain discipline and prevent shirking. As noted by
Kalecki (1943), high employment is bad for business because the self assurance and class
consciousness of the working classwill grow and the social position of the bosswill
be undermined (quoted from Kalecki (1971, p. 140-1). Overall, one would expect the
general deterioration of the business climate associated with high employment rates to
put a damper on rmsexpansion plans.
These considerations suggest a reformulation of the growth function for a mature
economy: the growth of production now responds to signals from both goods and labor
markets. Other input or cost signals could play a role but for simplicity intermediate inputs
are left out and rms typically maintain excess capital capacity. As far as production
decisions are concerned, the labor market therefore provides the relevant signal, and the
employment rate is used as the indicator of the state of the labor market. Thus, the
growth function for a mature economy includes two arguments, the prot share () and
the employment rate (e):15
Y^ = h(; e);h > 0; he < 0: (36)
As argued above, the key element in the Harrodian approach is the distinction between
a small short-run and large long-run sensitivity of investment to variations in aggregate
demand and with utilization as a state variable, this distinction can be captured by a
static relation between the accumulation rate and the rate of utilization:
K^ = (u) (37)
where  describes the relation between accumulation and desired utilization, and 0 >>
s.
Using (36)-(37) we have the following two-dimensional system:
u^ = Y^   K^ = h(; e)  (u) (38)
e^ = h(; e)  n (39)
15A static counterpart to this equation can be obtained by setting Y^ = 0. The equation then denes the
prot share as an increasing function of the employment rate. A short-run equilibrium relation of this kind
could be derived from prot maximization if rms have monopsony power and the (perceived) elasticity
of labor supply to the individual rm is decreasing as a function of the aggregate rate of employment.
Manning (2003) provides an extended analysis of monopsonistic features of the labor market.
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where n is the growth rate of the labor force. For simplicity I take n as exogenous;
a straightforward extension allows n to depend positively on the employment rate e.16
Retaining the linear saving function (28) and using a Kaldor/Marshall approach, the
prot share is still determined by the equilibrium condition for the product market, as in
(29)
 =
(u) + 
su
=  (u) (40)
The strong long-run sensitivity of accumulation to variations in utilization (0 > s)
implies that  0 > 0.
A stationary solution satises u^ = e^ = 0, and it follows that (u) = n. With (u) = n;
equation (40) determines a unique value of ;
 =
n+ 
s 1(n)
(41)
Substituting this value into the growth function, there is at most one steady-growth solu-
tion for e: A solution in the admissible range (0  e  1) exists if and only if
h(; 0)  n  h(; 1) (42)
The second inequality in (41) must be satised: as e increases it becomes progressively
more di¢ cult to expand employment, and if e = 1 it is logically impossible for the rate of
growth of employment to exceed the rate of growth of the labor force. The rst inequality,
however, need not be satised: rms may be insu¢ ciently dynamic and, as a result, a
capitalist economy may not be capable of growth at the natural rate. The likelihood of
this outcome increases if  is small, that is, for low values of the natural rate and high
saving rates. As argued by Nakatani and Skott (2007), Japans stagnation since about
1990 may be related to structural demand problems of this kind: with the exhaustion of
hidden unemployment, the growth rate had to come down, but a high saving rate and
low natural growth rate precluded a smooth transition to a path with minor uctuations
around a new steady-growth solution with g = n:
Assuming the existence of a steady-growth solution, the local stability is determined
by the Jacobian,
J(u; e) =

u[h 
0   0] uhe
eh 
0 ehe

(43)
16High employment rates may stimulate the growth of the labor force in several ways. Immigration is an
obvious mechanism in open economies; for a closed economy, changes in participation rates may a¤ect the
growth of the labor force in the medium run, and high employment and incipient labor shortages may serve
as incentives for labor saving innovation in the long run. The argument could be formalized by assuming
that n = n(e); n0(e)  0.
14
with
det(J) =  ue0he > 0
tr(J) = u[h 0   0] + ehe
The determinant is unambiguously positive and the trace must become negative if the
employment e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. An outcome with a negative trace may require
employment e¤ects that are implausibly strong. A weaker employment e¤ect, however,
is su¢ cient to generate a stable limit cycle and bounded uctuations around the locally
unstable, stationary solution (see Skott (1989, 1989a)). The negative feedback e¤ect
from employment to the growth rate of output mirrors the homeostatic mechanism in
Goodwins (1967) formalization of a Marxian growth cycle. Goodwins model excludes
Keynesian e¤ective demand problems, but the same basic feedback e¤ects tend to stabilize
the Harrodian system.
The phase diagram in gure 5 illustrates the dynamics. The model produces clockwise
movements in an (e; u)-space (or equivalently, since  =  (u); in (e; )-space). The
predicted movements in employment, utilization and protability are broadly consistent
with the stylized facts, and the marriage of destabilizing Harrodian e¤ects with stabilizing
Marxian mechanisms provides a unied explanation of growth and cycles.
Figure 5 about here
The boundedness of the uctuations implies that the (locally) unstable steady-growth
solution becomes relevant for the long-run e¤ects of changes in parameters and exogenous
variables. The average values of e; u and  in the long run need not be exactly equal
to the steady-growth solutions, but the comparative statics of the steady-growth solution
will give a good approximation to changes in the average values.17 Using the steady-
growth conditions, it is readily seen that improved animal spirits (an upward shift in the
accumulation and /or growth function) will be expansionary. But since the growth rate is
pinned down by the growth of the labor force, there is only a level e¤ect: the employment
rate goes up following a rise in animal spirits, as does the prot share if the accumulation
function shifts up.18 Analogously, a decline in the saving rate raises both the prot share
and the rate of employment. An increase in labor militancy will be reected in a downward
shift in the growth function and, as in the Goodwin model, the result is a decline in the
steady-growth value of the employment rate.
17The results will be biased only insofar as changes in a parameter a¤ects the magnitude of the deviation
between steady-growth solution and time-average. The existence of an unchanged deviation between the
two generates no errors.
18The absence of a well-dened NAIRU is standard in post Keynesian and structuralist theory. My own
take on this issue is discussed in Skott (1999, 2005a).
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5 A Robinson/Steindl approach
Essentially, the Harrodian instability is curtailed in section 4 by abandoning the instant-
aneous output adjustments at a given markup and, in the mature economy, by variations
in the reserve army of labor. I have referred to the models as Kaldorian or Marshallian
since demand-determined variations in prices and income distribution are at the heart of
the analysis, but the analysis in section 4 also has a¢ nities with the work of Robinson
(1956, 1962) and Steindl (1952).19
5.1 Dual economies
Robinson set up models with multiple steady-growth paths. The utilization rate is at
the desired rate in these models but the mechanism is di¤erent than the one in section
4. Accumulation is a non-linear function of protability while price competition, she
suggested, keeps utilization at the desired rate.20
Her verbal argument (1962, p. 47) implies that the accumulation function takes the
form
g =
I
K
= f(re) (44)
where re is the expected future rate of prot on new investment and f 0 > 0 Retaining the
linear saving function (28), the current rate of prot is determined by the market-clearing
condition for the product market,
su = sr = g (45)
In steady growth we have re = r, and assuming that the investment function f is strictly
concave, the well-known banana diagramemerges with two steady-growth solutions.
The stability properties of these steady-growth solutions depend on the formation of
prot expectations, and most of Robinsons analysis seems to rely on static expectations.
Under conditions of imperfect competition, however, rmsexpected prot rate, re; cannot
be independent of their investment decisions. Thus, implicitly, the specication in equation
(44) seems to assume perfect competition. This assumption is logically consistent but
unattractive, both theoretically and empirically, and Robinson acknowledges as much.
She notes that in reality, of course, markets for manufacturers are highly imperfect,
prices are fairly sticky and changes in investment are generally accompanied by changes
in output and employment(Robinson, 1962, p. 65). The sluggish adjustment in prices
can be formalized by letting the prot share, ; adjust to the di¤erence between actual
and desired capacity utilization
_ = (u  ud) (46)
19Flaschel and Skott (2006) discuss Steindls analysis.
20She assumes that competition (in the short-period sense) is su¢ ciently keen to keep prices at the
level at which normal capacity output can be sold(Robinson, 1962, p. 46).
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where  > 0 is the adjustment speed. With slow price adjustment it is now instantaneous
movements in the utilization rate u that ensure the equalization of saving and investment
in the short run. The saving-investment balance and the denition of the prot rate,
r = u; imply that
u =
g + 
s
= (g; ) (47)
where g =
1
s =
u
g+ > 0 and  =   g+s2 =  s u
2
g+ < 0:
Turning to the specication of the investment function outside steady growth, the
distinction between expected and actual protability in Robinsons argument essentially
serves to introduce sluggish adjustments in accumulation. In a continuous-time setting,
this can be achieved by a dynamic version of the investment function (44),21
_g = [f(u; )  g] (48)
where  > 0 and fu > 0; f > 0, and where the ill-dened variable re has been replaced
by the current values of the utilization rate and the prot share.
Equations (48) and (46) yield a two-dimensional dynamic system in the growth rate
of the capital stock and the prot share
_g = ff [(g; ); ]  gg (49)
_ = [(g; )  ud] (50)
Stationary solutions satisfy u = ud (using (46)) and g = f(ud; ) = f(ud; g
sud
) (using
(47)-(48) and u = ud). Turning to local stability, the Jacobian is given by
J(g; ) =

(fug   1) (f + fu)
g 

(51)
and, evaluated at the stationary point, we have
det(J) =  ( + fg) = 
ud
g + 
(sud   f) (52)
21Mathematically this formulation is closely related to Robinsons own analysis. The equilibrium con-
dition for the product market implies that r = g=s. If g = f(re) and d
dt
re = _re = (r   re), it follows
that
_re = (
f(re)
s
  re)
and hence,
_g = f 0(re) _re = f 0(re)[
g
s
  f 1(g)]
Since f 0 > 0, this equation has the same stability properties as the equation
_g = [f(
g
s
)  g] = [f(r)  g]
The latter equation, in turn, is a special case of equation (48).
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tr(J) =



fu
ud
g + 
  1

 


ud
g + 
sud

(53)
The Robinsonian stability condition desired investment being less sensitive than saving
to changes in the prot share ensures that det(J) is positive. This condition is satised
at the high equilibrium in the banana diagram, ruling out saddlepoint instability. Local
asymptotic stability of the high solution depends on the sign of the trace. In the expression
for the trace, the rst term in square brackets may be either positive or negative. The
second term, however, is negative and local stability is assured if the adjustment speed
for prices is fast (relative to the adjustment speed of investment). Thus, the explicit
introduction of pricing dynamics conrms Robinsons main conclusion in a setting without
perfect competition.
5.2 Mature economies
The high and stable solution in the banana diagram satises the Robinsonian stability
condition: investment is less sensitive than saving to variations in protability. This
condition (as the corresponding condition with respect to the growth function in section
4) may be plausible at growth rates that are empirically relevant for successful developing
countries, but the model and the high solution seem less promising for mature economies
with modest growth rates. As in section 4, variations in the reserve army can be included
explicitly in the analysis of these mature economies: employment e¤ects may stabilize the
otherwise unstable low solution in the banana diagram.
The size of the reserve army could inuence accumulation and/or pricing. As an
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example consider the following extension of the dual-economy model:22
_g = [f(u; ; e)  g]; fu > 0; f > 0; fe < 0 (54)
_ = (u  ud) (55)
k^ = g   n (56)
where the new state variable k describes the ratio of the capital stock to the labor force.
The ratio k is denitionally related to employment and utilization, and - normalizing units
so that labor productivity is equal to one - we have
e = uk (57)
The pricing equation (55) is unchanged (but re-stated for convenience). The innovation
compared to the dual economy is the introduction of the employment rate e as a determ-
inant of the long-run accumulation function f in (54). The utilization rate adjusts to clear
the product market and is still given by (47).
A stationary solution satises
u = ud (58)
g = n (59)
 =
n+ 
sud
(60)
f(ud; ; k) = n (61)
22This example retains the dynamic specication of the investment function in equation (48). It is
straightforward to set up a two-dimensional analogue to the model in section 4.2. Having employment
enter negatively in the growth function (36) corresponds to letting the change in the prot share depend
positively on employment. Thus, let
_ = H(u; e) = (u  ud) = (u  (e)); 0 > 0
k^ = K^   n = f()  n
u =
f() + 
s
The accumulation function f() conforms to the Harrodian principle since the prot share is now a state
variable. The Jacobian for this two-dimensional system is given by
J(; k) =

(u   0ku)  0u
kf 0 0

and
det(J) = kf 00u > 0
tr(J) = u(1  0k)
The derivative u is positive at the low, unstable solution in the banana diagram, and stability requires
that the employment e¤ect on desired utilizationin the equation for _ be su¢ ciently strong.
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Equations (58)-(60) give explicit and unique solutions for u; g and , and substituting
these solutions into (61) we get a unique solution for k and thereby (using (57)) for e.
Local stability is determined by the Jacobian
J(g; ; k) =
24 [(fu + kfe) 1s   1]  [(fu + kfe) g+s2   f] fe g+s 1s   g+s2 0
k 0 0
35 (62)
The necessary and su¢ cient Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local stability are that,
evaluated at the equilibrium,
1. tr(J) = [(fu + kfe) 1s   1]   g+s2 < 0
2. det(J1) + det(J2) + det(J3) = [
g+
s2
  f 1s ]  kfe g+s > 0
3. det(J) = k g+
s2
fe
g+
s < 0
4.  tr(J)[det(J1) + det(J2) + det(J3)] + det(J) > 0
The third condition is always satised, and straightforward calculations show that the
other three conditions must be satised if the employment e¤ect fe is su¢ ciently strong.23
Comparing the Robinsonian and Kaldorian formulations in sections 4-5, the steady-
growth equality between desired and actual utilization - equation (21) - is based on pri-
cing/output behavior in Robinson and on accumulation in Kaldor; to get a steady-growth
relation between growth and protability, conversely, the Robinsonian model uses cap-
ital accumulation instead of output growth, as in the Kaldorian equation (27). From a
steady-growth perspective these changes in the assignment of pricing and accumulation
make no di¤erence.24 The relative adjustment speeds for output and prices are reversed in
the two models, and this reversal a¤ects the short-run dynamics. Both versions, however,
have utilization at the desired rate in steady growth, both versions endogenize the prot
share and use this endogenization as a stabilizing factor, and both versions yield multiple
steady-growth solutions for a dual economy.2526
In behavioral terms I nd the Kaldorian version more persuasive and its short-run
dynamics t some important stylized facts. A more detailed discussion of the relative
merits of the two versions, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
23The expression in condition 4 is quadratic in fe:
24Steindl (1952) also set up models with multiple steady-growth paths, focusing on the stable high-
growth solution. Steindls verbal argument is close to Robinsons and includes sluggish adjustments in the
markup. As shown by Flaschel and Skott (2006), however, his focus on a high-growth solution in a formal
model with a xed markup seems misplaced.
25Neither prices not output are completely exible, and Chiarella et al. (2005) pursue specications
with sluggishness in both prices and output.
26Behavioral relations between growth and protability have been discussed by many other writers,
including Penrose (1959), Wood (1975) and Eichner (1976).
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6 Conclusion
The Kaleckian growth model has become a standard work horse for the analysis of growth
and distribution. The model is simple and tractable and it lends itself to extensions in
many directions. The simplicity and tractability, however, comes at a cost. The model
includes a questionable stability condition and key predictions of the model, including
the accommodating long-run variations in utilization, nd little support in empirical evid-
ence. At a methodological level, moreover, the standard Kaleckian approach may have
unfortunate consequences since it plays down the need to think dynamically.
Dynamic issues were at the heart of the Keynesian revolution. The fundamental pro-
position of the General Theory is that even with exible prices and wages, the market
mechanism can not be expected to ensure full employment. A market-clearing neoclas-
sical general equilibrium may exist but is unlikely to be stable, even under hypothetical
conditions of highly exible prices and wages.27 Harrod extended the dynamic analysis to
movements over time of a Keynesian economy, his basic approach consisting in a mar-
riage of the acceleration principle and the multiplier theory (Harrod 1939, p. 14).
A number of early contributors (including Samuelson 1939, Kaldor 1940, Hicks 1950 and
Goodwin 1951), formalized these interactions and although in some ways primitive, the
fundamental insights remain valid: steady growth paths of a mature capitalist economy
are likely to be locally unstable.
These dynamic issues are glossed over by the standard Kaleckian macro model with its
emphasis on stable steady-growth paths, its neglect of lags and its use of utilization rates
as an accommodating variable, in the long run as well as the short run. The predominant
focus in Kaleckian theory on dual economy regimes, moreover, may threaten the relevance
of the analysis with respect to most OECD economies.
This paper has discussed alternatives to the Kaleckian model. Sections 4-5 used en-
dogenous variations in income distribution and/or employment to stabilize an otherwise
unstable economy. I consider these mechanisms theoretically and empirically plausible
but other solutions to the Harrodian instability problemhave been suggested. Shaikh
(2007), for instance, denies the inherently unstable tendency in Harrods argument while
Dumenil and Levy (1999) accept the instability tendency but suggest that the stabilizing
27Old Keynesianslike Tobin have emphasized this point (Tobin 1975).
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force comes from monetary policy.2829
In general, the Harrodian alternatives are more complex than the Kaleckian model.
They remain tractable, however, and the basic models in this paper can be (and have
been) extended in a number of ways; Skott and Ryoo (2008), for instance, analyze the
implications of nancialization, using models that include explicit nancial stocks. Most
importantly, in my view, the Harrodian inspired models tell a behavioral story that is
more convincing and that ts the empirical evidence better than the Kaleckian model.30
The current dominance of the Kaleckian model therefore is unfortunate.
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